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Interesting connection has been established between two apparently unrelated concepts, namely,
quantum nonlocality and Bayesian game theory. It has been shown that nonlocal correlations in the
form of advice can outperform classical equilibrium strategies in common interest Bayesian games
and also in conflicting interest games. However, classical equilibrium strategies can be of two types,
fair and unfair. Whereas in fair equilibrium payoffs of different players are same, in unfair case they
differ. Advantage of nonlocal correlation has been demonstrated over fair strategies. In this work we
show that quantum strategies can outperform even the unfair classical equilibrium strategies. For this
purpose we consider a class of two players games which as a special case includes the conflicting
game proposed in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. These games can have both fair and unfair
classical equilibria and also can have only unfair ones. We provide a simple analytic characterization
of the nonlocal correlations that are advantageous over the classical equilibrium strategies in these
games.
Undoubtedly one of the most fundamental contradic-
tions of Quantum mechanics (QM) with classical physics
gets manifested in its nonlocal behavior. This bizarre fea-
ture of QM was first established in the seminal work of J.
S. Bell [1], where he has shown that QM is incompatible
with the local-realistic world view of classical physics.
More precisely, Bell showed that measurement statistics
of multipartite entangled quantum systems can violate
an empirically testable local realistic inequality (in gen-
eral called Bell type inequalities) which establishes the
denial of local realism underlying QM. Since Bell’s work,
nonlocality remains at the center of quantum founda-
tional research (see [2] and references therein) and it
has been verified in numerous successful experiments,
starting from the famous Aspect’s experiment [3] to very
recent loop-hole free tests [4]. Apart from foundational
interest quantum nonlocal correlations have been proved
to be the key resource in various device-independent
protocols [5]. Very recently Brunner and Linden have es-
tablished that Bell nonlocality has interesting connection
with a seemingly different area of research, namely, the-
ory of Bayesian game [6]. A Bayesian game can be played
under classical equilibrium strategies which are of two
types, fair equilibria and unfair equilibria. Whereas in
fair equilibria payoffs of different parties are same, in
unfair equilibria they differ. It has been shown that
QM can provide advantageous strategies over the best
classical strategies in common interest Bayesian games
[6] and can also outperform the fair classical equilib-
rium strategies in conflicting games [7]. The aim of this
present paper is to study whether nonlocal correlation
can be advantageous over the classical unfair equilib-
rium strategies in such a games.
Operationally Bell type inequalities can be best un-
derstood in terms of games involving several number
of spatially separated parties. Each party receives some
inputs and produces some outputs. No communica-
tion is allowed among the parties during the game but,
they can share correlations. The aim is to cooperat-
ively optimize some payoff function. If the correlation
shared among them is classical one (or more precisely to
say local realistic one) then the payoff is upper bounded
by some threshold value. However it may be possible
that using correlation of entangled quantum states these
optimal classical bounds can be superseded, which es-
tablishes nonlocal behavior of the shared entangled state.
The canonical example of such game is Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) game [8] involving two parties,
say Alice and Bob, each with binary inputs and binary
outputs. Whereas payoff of this game in local realistic
theory is upper bounded by 3/4, in quantum theory one
can achieve it up to 1/2(1+ 1/
√
2).
Game theoretic formulation of Bell type inequalit-
ies prompted Brunner et al. to explore the connection
between Bell nonlocality and Bayesian game theory [6].
The theory of Bayesian game was discovered by Harsa-
nyi and the framework is developed for games with
incomplete information [9] (see also [10]). In such a
game, each player may have some private information
unknown to other players; on the other hand the play-
ers may have a common piece of advice and thus can
follow correlated strategies, giving rise to the concept of
correlated Nash equilibrium [11]. As pointed out in [6],
the concept of private information in Bayesian games
is analogous to the notion of locality in Bell inequalit-
ies (BI). And the fact that common advice in Bayesian
games does not reveal the private information mimics
the concept of no-signaling resources in case of BI. A
larger class of such no-signaling correlations, proven to
be stronger resource than local realistic correlations in
nonlocal games, are available in QM. Naturally the ques-
tion arises whether such nonlocal quantum correlations
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2indeed provide advantage in Bayesian games over the
classical strategies. Interestingly, in their paper Brunner
et al. have answered affirmatively to this question [6].
The CHSH game as well as GHZ game [12], Mermin
game [13], Magic Square Game [14, 15], Hidden Match-
ing game [16, 17] and the three games of [6] are all
example of common interest games where the involving
parties have to optimize some payoff, cooperatively. On
the other hand in conflicting interest game interests of
the players differ, resulting to conflict in their best ac-
tions. Battle of Sexes (BoS) is a classic example of such
conflicting interest game. Interestingly in [7], the au-
thors have provided an example of a conflicting game
where quantum strategies can outperform the classical
fair equilibrium strategies. Furthermore, using semi-
definite programming (SDP) they have shown that Bell
states along with suitably chosen measurements are the
quantum equilibrium strategies for the said game. Using
the initials of the authors let call this PKLSZDK game.
A Baysian game can have only fair equilibria, both
fair and unfair equilibria or only unfair equilibria. In
this present paper we address the question whether
quantum advice can surpass the classical unfair equilib-
rium strategies in such games. Interestingly, we answer
affirmatively to this questions. For this purpose we have
constructed a two parametric class of two players game,
each player having two types/inputs and two possible
actions/outputs for each type. As a special case, the
PKLSZDK game is also included in this class. For certain
conditions on the parameters we show that these games
can have only unfair equilibria. To show the advantages
of nonlocal correlation over the classical equilibrium
strategies we take a very analytic approach. First we
show that in the 2− 2− 2 scenario (i.e. two-party, each
with two measurements and each measurement with
two outcomes) any no signaling correlation can be ex-
pressed in a canonical form. Using this canonical form
we completely characterize the no-signaling correlations
providing advantages over the classical fair and unfair
strategies in these games. One interesting consequence
of our analysis is that it provides a simple explanation
(without using any SDP), why the said strategies of [7]
are quantum fair equilibrium one.
A class of two players Bayesian games: Here we ad-
opt the same notations used in Ref.[7]. Let Alice and
Bob are two players involved in the game. Alice’s
and Bob’s types/inputs are denoted as xA ∈ XA and
xB ∈ XB, respectively. For each types they take some ac-
tions/outputs denoted as yA ∈ YA and yB ∈ YB and ac-
cordingly they are given payoffs/utilities denoted as uA
and uB, respectively, where ui : XA ×XB ×YA ×YB →
R , for i ∈ {A, B}. For the class of games considered
here, XA = XB = YA = YB = {0, 1} and the utilit-
Table I. Utility table for the game G(κ, τ). Both κ and τ are
positive.
xA ∧ xB = 0 xA ∧ xB = 1
yB = 0 yB = 1 yB = 0 yB = 1
yA = 0 (1, κ) (0, 0) (0, 0) (3/4, 3/4)
yA = 1 (0, 0) (1/2, τ) (3/4, 3/4) (0, 0)
ies are given in Table-I. In accordance with the para-
meter κ and τ of Table-I let us denote such a game as
G(κ, τ). Whenever κ < τ, there is a conflict between
Alice and Bob in choosing their actions. Note that the
game G(1/2, 1) is the conflicting game studied in [7].
In the case of correlated strategies, i.e., when the
parties are given some common advice, the average
payoff is calculated as:
Fi =∑
x,y
P(x)P(y|x)ui(x, y). (1)
Here P(x) is the probability distribution over the Alice’s
and Bob’s joint type x ≡ (xA, xB) which is considered to
be uniform for this particular game and P(y|x) denote
the conditional joint action y ≡ (yA, yB) given the type
x, i.e., the probability that Alice takes action yA and Bob
takes action yB given their joint type (xA, xB). In the
case of such correlated strategies, Aumann introduced
the concept of correlated equilibria (CE) [11], which have
several nice properties: they are easier to find [18], every
Nash equilibrium is a CE and convex combinations of
CE are again CE. For playing the game G(κ, τ) each of
Alice and Bob can take one of the following four pure
classical strategies:
g1i (xi) = 0; g
2
i (xi) = 1; g
3
i (xi) = xi; g
4
i (xi) = xi ⊕ 1;
where g1i (xi) = 0 means that i
th party takes the action 0
whatever be the type is and similarly the other cases; ⊕
denotes modulo 2 sum. For 16 possible pure strategies
of Alice and Bob (together) their average payoffs (FA, FB)
are listed in Table-II. As discussed earlier, G(κ, τ) be a
conflicting interest game when τ > κ. In this case when
κ < 34 the strategies (g
1
A, g
3
B), (g
3
A, g
4
B), and (g
4
A, g
2
B)
are Nash equilibria and let’s denote the correspond-
ing payoffs, (Feq1A , F
eq1
B ) ≡
(
11
16 ,
3
16 +
κ
2
)
, (Feq2A , F
eq2
B ) ≡( 9
16 ,
3
16 +
κ+τ
4
)
, and (Feq3A , F
eq3
B ) ≡
( 7
16 ,
3
16 +
τ
2
)
, respect-
ively; and for κ > 34 the strategies (g
1
A, g
1
B), (g
3
A, g
4
B), and
(g4A, g
2
B) are Nash equilibria with corresponding payoffs
as (Feq
′
1
A , F
eq′1
B ) ≡
( 3
4 ,
3κ
4
)
, (Feq2A , F
eq2
B ) ≡
( 9
16 ,
3
16 +
κ+τ
4
)
,
and (Feq3A , F
eq3
B ) ≡
( 7
16 ,
3
16 +
τ
2
)
, respectively. For the
parameter value τ > κ > 1, all three equilibrium are
unfair and in every case Bob’s payoff is greater than
3g1B g
2
B g
3
B g
4
B
g1A
(
3
4 ,
3κ
4
) (
3
16 ,
3
16
) (
11
16 ,
3
16 +
κ
2
) (
1
4 ,
κ
4
)
g2A
(
3
16 ,
3
16
) (
3
8 ,
3τ
4
) (
1
8 ,
τ
4
) (
7
16 ,
3
16 +
τ
2
)
g3A
(
11
16 ,
3
16 +
κ
2
) (
1
8 ,
τ
4
) (
1
4 ,
κ
4
) (
9
16 ,
3
16 +
κ+τ
4
)
g4A
(
1
4 ,
κ
4
) (
7
16 ,
3
16 +
τ
2
) (
9
16 ,
3
16 +
κ+τ
4
) (
1
8 ,
τ
4
)
Table II. (Color on-line) Alice’s and Bob’s average payoffs
(FA, FB) for different pure strategies in the game G(κ, τ). For
conflicting interest case (τ > κ) there are three equilibria when
κ < 34 (red and blue) and when κ >
3
4 (green and blue), and
for τ < κ there is one equilibrium: red when κ < 34 and green
when κ > 34 .
Alice’s. Note that in these cases even no fair correl-
ated equilibrium strategy is possible. The cases where
κ + τ = 1.5 give a fair equilibria strategy as occurred
in the conflicting game of [7]. When κ > τ it turns
out to be a game with only one equilibrium; for κ < 34
the strategy (g1A, g
3
B) is Nash equilibrium and the cor-
responding payoff, (Feq1A , F
eq1
B ) ≡
(
11
16 ,
3
16 +
κ
2
)
, and for
κ > 34 the Nash equilibrium is the strategy (g
1
A, g
1
B)
with (Feq
′
1
A , F
eq′1
B ) ≡
( 3
4 ,
3κ
4
)
. Since any classical (local
realistic) advice can be written as P(yA, yB|xA, xb) =∫
dλP(yA|xA,λ)P(yB|xB,λ), with λ being a local vari-
able (also called hidden variable by the quantum found-
ation community), so convexity ensures that using any
such advice it is not possible to overcome the equilib-
rium payoffs. However in quantum world there are
no-signaling correlations that are not in this local real-
istic form (thus called nonlocal) and hence there may
be a possibility to overcome the classical equilibrium
payoffs.
2− 2− 2 no-signaling correlations: For the two-party scen-
ario with two two-outcome measurements for each party
let denote the joint probability distribution as P(ab|ij),
where the outcomes a, b ∈ {+,−} and the measurement
settings i, j ∈ {0, 1}. We can express the joint distribu-
tion as [19]:
P(ab|ij) ≡ (cij,mij − cij, nij − cij, 1− nij −mij + cij), (2)
with outcomes in the order (++,+−,−+,−−). Here
mij and nij denote the corresponding marginal prob-
abilities of Alice and Bob, with positivity impos-
ing the restrictions, max{0,mij + nij − 1} ≤ cij ≤
min{mij, nij} ∀ ij. According to no-signaling Alice’s mar-
ginal outcome probability should not depend on Bob’s
measurement settings and vice versa, which can be ex-
pressed as m00 = m01 := m0, m10 = m11 := m1, n00 =
n10 := n0, n01 = n11 := n1. The celebrated Bell-CHSH
expression is given by,B = 〈00〉 + 〈01〉 + 〈10〉 − 〈11〉,
where 〈ij〉 := P(+ + |ij) − P(+ − |ij) − P(− + |ij) +
P(−− |ij). A no-signaling probability distribution has
a local realistic description if and only if it satisfies the
Bell-CHSH inequality, i.e., iff |B| ≤ 2 [20]. In terms of
probabilities, the Bell-CHSH expression becomes,
B = 2+ 4(c00 + c01 + c10 − c11)− 4(m0 + n0). (3)
Collection of all such no-signaling correlations NS form
a 8 dimensional polytope with 24 vertices and the fa-
cets are determined by positivity and no-signaling con-
straints. Collection of all classical (local realistic) cor-
relations L and all quantum correlations Q are convex
sets lying within NS . While L is again a polytope with
trivial facets given by positivity and the nontrivial facets
determined by Bell-CHSH inequalities, the set Q is con-
vex but not a polytope [21]. Any correlation outside L
is called nonlocal and the strict set inclusion relations
L ⊂ Q ⊂ NS reflect the fact that quantum theory con-
tains nonlocal correlations, but nonlocality of quantum
theory is restricted compared to general no-signaling
correlations. While B can be at most 2
√
2 in Q [22], in
NS it can go up to 4 [23].
Nonlocal advantage over classical strategies: In the
Bayesian game described above, the two players can
be commonly advised by a general no-signaling correla-
tion. Given such an advice NS ∈ NS Alice’s and Bob’s
average payoffs, respectively, reads:
FNSA =
1
16
[3+ 3/2B+ 2(m0 + n0) + (m1 + n1)] , (4)
FNSB =
1
16
[(10τ − 2κ) + (τ + κ)B+ 4(κ − τ)(m0 + n0)
+(3− 4τ)(m1 + n1) + 4 (κ + τ − 3/2) c11] . (5)
A no-signaling nonlocal advice outperforms some clas-
sical equilibrium payoff (FeqA , F
eq
B ) if F
NS
i > F
eq
i , for
i = A, B. As an explicit example in the following we
study the PKLSZDK game, i.e., the game G(1/2, 1). For
this game it becomes that FA + FB = 34
(
1+ 14B
)
, i.e.,
the sum of Alice’s and Bob’s average payoffs in classical,
quantum, and no-signaling theories can be at most 9/8,
3/4(1+ 1/
√
2), and 3/2, respectively.
(a) Fair strategy: For fair strategy the average equi-
librium payoffs of Alice and Bob are identical, which
gives the condition, 2(m0 + n0) +m1 + n1 = 3 and both
Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs become 3/8(1+ 1/4B). Thus
any no-signaling advice will be advantageous over the
best fair classical strategy if,
3
8
(
1+
1
4
B
)
>
9
16
⇒ B > 2. (6)
As described in [7], a quantum strategy is specified
by the triple {ρAB, (M0A,M1A), (M0B,M1B)} [7], where
4ρAB is some bipartite quantum state provided to Alice
and Bob as advice andMki are two outcomes positive-
operator-valued-measures (POVM) for k ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈
{A, B}. For example, two qubit Werner class of
states Wp = p|ψ−〉〈ψ−|+ (1− p) I2 ⊗ I2 , where |ψ−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 − |1〉 ⊗ |0〉) is the singlet state and I be the
identity operator, satisfies the first condition for project-
ive measurements performed by Alice and Bob. And
for suitably chosen measurement they satisfy the second
condition whenever p > 1√
2
. Moreover the optimal Bell-
CHSH violation in quantum theory, i.e., 2
√
2 is uniquely
(up to local unitary freedom) achieved by singlet state
with suitably chosen measurements [24]. This implies
that the singlet state with corresponding measurement
settings describe a fair equilibrium strategy in quantum
theory. It is noteworthy that more general no-signaling
advices can outperform best quantum strategy.
(a) Unfair strategy: From Table-II note that (g1A, g
3
B) is
an unfair (to Bob) classical equilibrium strategy with
Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs 11/16 and 7/16, respectively
for the game G(1/2, 1). So a no-signaling advice will
be considered advantageous over this strategy if FA >
11/16 and FB > 7/16 or equivalently to say:
3
2
B+ 2(m0 + n0) + (m1 + n1) > 8, and (7)
3
2
B− 2(m0 + n0)− (m1 + n1) > −2. (8)
From conditions (7) and (8) it is clear that the no-
signaling correlations need to be nonlocal to provide
advantage over the classical unfair equilibrium strategy.
If we consider the following one parameter family of
no-signaling correlations:
A = qPR+ (1− q)D, (9)
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and PR = {PPR(ab|ij)} and D =
{PD(ab|ij) with, PPR(ab|ij) = 1/2 if α ⊕ β = ij and
0 otherwise, and PD(ab|ij) = 1 if α = β = 1 and 0
otherwise, then straightforward calculation gives,
FA =
11
16
+
q
16
, FB =
7
16
+
5q
16
, (10)
establishing advantage over the unfair classical equi-
librium strategy for nonzero value of q. However this
example does not solve the question whether quantum
theory provides advantage over the classical strategies.
This is because in Ref.[25] it has been shown that in the
asymptotic limit the correlation A of Eq.(9) can be dis-
tilled to maximally nonlocal PR correlation and hence
quantum realization of this correlation is not possible.
To find a quantum strategy better than classical unfair
equilibrium strategy we first consider the singlet state as
the advice. For the sharp as well as unsharp [26] meas-
urements performed by Alice or Bob on their respective
parts the marginal probabilities are completely random
and hence it is not possible to fulfill the condition (7) and
(8) simultaneously. Though more general two outcome
POVM can give biased marginal but still they are not use-
ful (see [27] for detail). So singlet state is no good in this
purpose and similar argument applies for any bipartite
state with completely mixed marginals. Naturally we
then consider a pure state |ψ〉AB = a|00〉+ b|11〉 as the
advice, with Alice’s and Bob’s measurement directions
specified as, Mki ≡
(
sin θki cos φ
k
i , sin θ
k
i sin φ
k
i , cos θ
k
i
)
,
where k ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ {A, B}. Interestingly, we find
that such advice can fulfill the requirement. For ex-
ample, if we take an advice with a = 0.9 and the meas-
urement directions θ0A = −θ0B = − pi15 , φ0A = −φ0B = pi2 ,
θ1i =
pi
3 , and φ
1
i =
pi
2 , then their average payoffs be-
come FA = 0.7066(> 1116 ) and FB = 0.5163(>
7
16 ) (see
[27]). However, this strategy is not a quantum equi-
librium strategy. Because, given the same advice and
same measurement settings for Alice, Bob can fix his
measurement directions as θ0(new)B = 0.451517, θ
1(new)
B =
1.25911, φ0(new)B = −1.5708, φ1(new)B = 1.5708 so that his
new payoff becomes FnewB = 0.5213 > FB >
7
16 . But for
these new measurement choices Alice’s payoff modifies
to 1116 < F
new
A = 0.6981 < 0.7066 = FA. Even if the
parties consider two outcome POVMs, the equilibrium
will not be achieved.
At this point one can think of a stronger refinement
of the equilibrium concept, known as social optim-
ality [28]. It is a choice of strategies, one by each
player, that maximizes the sum of the players’ pay-
offs. Of course, maximization of the sum of play-
ers’ payoff may not necessarily lead to the satisfac-
tion of all the participating players. Given the advice,
FA + FB = 34 (1+
1
2
√
1+ 4a2(1− a2)) = 1.2266, and one
can find a strategy (see [27]) such that F∗A = 0.6978 >
11
16
and F∗B = 0.5288 >
7
16 . Clearly this ‘∗′ strategy is a social
optimal one, while the previous two are not. It is quite
mentioning that quantum strategies also outperform
the other classical unfair (unfair to Alice) equilibrium
strategy. The analysis remains same if a mixed entangled
advice is given instead of pure one.
Discussions: Nonlocality, arguably one of the most con-
troversial issues in quantum foundations, has acquired
lots of research attention of information theorists during
last two decades due to its practical usefulness in sev-
eral device independent information theoretic protocols.
Very recently interesting connection of this peculiar re-
source has been established in another very important
branch of study, namely Bayesian game theory which
has several applications in economics, social and polit-
5ical science, and psychology. Nonlocal correlations have
been shown to be advantageous in common interest
Bayesian games and also in conflicting games over the
classical fair strategy [6, 7, 30]. In this work we have
shown that such nonlocal correlations can outperform
the unfair classical equilibrium strategies of such games.
Moreover, quantum advices can provide unfair social
optimal strategies better than the classical one. To prove
this advantages we have considered a two parametric
class of two players games which can have both fair
and unfair classical equilibria and also only unfair equi-
libria, depending on the different parameters values.
Although we have considered a particular class but our
analysis points out the effectiveness of nonlocal advice
over any classical correlation. We also completely charac-
terize the no-signaling advices providing advantages in
these game over the fair and unfair classical equilibrium
strategies.
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APPENDIX
Singlet state is no good for unfair strategy
As we have discussed in the manuscript, a strategy
will be advantageous over classical unfair equilibrium
one if,
3
2
B+K > 8, and (11)
3
2
B−K > −2, (12)
where K = 2(m0 + n0) +m1 + n1, with mi (ni) being the
marginal of + outcome of the ith measurement of Alice
(Bob). For singlet state the marginal state of each party
is completely mixed state. Projective measurement Maˆ
and unsharp measurement M(λ)aˆ along some direction aˆ,
is given by,
Maˆ = {12 (I+ aˆ.~σ),
1
2
(I− aˆ.~σ)}, (13)
M(λ)aˆ = {
1
2
(I+ λaˆ.~σ),
1
2
(I− λaˆ.~σ)}, (14)
where 12 (I ± nˆ.~σ) are projectors corresponding to up
and down eigenstates, and 12 (I± λnˆ.~σ) being the cor-
responding unsharp effect with 0 < λ ≤ 1. For such
measurements performed on the each part of the sing-
let state the marginal statistics is completely random.
Hence the value of K is always 3. Since the value of B
can be at most 2
√
2, the left hand side of Eq.(11) can be
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Figure 1. (Color on-line) (Color on-line) BS = 2.82. Red
curve is for (19) and blue is for (20). Allowed values of (α, µ)
satisfying condition (15) lie in the green region. Allowed values
of (α, µ) satisfying both the conditions (19) and (20) lies in the
yellow regions.
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Figure 2. (Color on-line) BS = −2.82. Red curve is for (19) and
blue is for (20). Allowed values of (α, µ) satisfying condition
(15) lie in the green region. Allowed values of (α, µ) satisfying
both the conditions (19) and (20) lies in the yellow regions.
at most 3(1+
√
2) < 8. So singlet state along with sharp
or unsharp measurements is no good for the purpose.
However considering a more general two outcome
qubit measurement one can get the value of K very
close to 6 and hence having a possibility of satisfying
the condition (11). At the same time the setting must
have satisfy the condition (12). In the following we
study these possibilities. The most general two outcome
qubit measurement (POVM) along mˆ can be expressed
as {Emˆ(α, µ), I− Emˆ(α, µ)} [26], where
Emˆ(α, µ) =
1
2
(αI+ µmˆ.~σ), with
0 < α ≤ 2, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ min{α, 2− α}. (15)
If Alice performs the POVM M ≡ {Emˆ(α, µ), I −
Emˆ(α, µ)} and Bob performs the POVM N ≡
{Enˆ(α, µ), I− Enˆ(α, µ)} on their respective part of the
7singlet state, the joint conditional probabilities read:
P(++) =
1
4
[α2 − µ2mˆ.nˆ],
P(+−) = 1
4
[α(2− α) + µ2mˆ.nˆ],
P(−+) = 1
4
[(2− α)α+ µ2mˆ.nˆ],
P(−−) = 1
4
[α2 − µ2mˆ.nˆ]. (16)
The marginal probabilities are therefore,
Pmˆ(+) := P(++) + P(+−) = α/2,
Pnˆ(+) := P(−+) + P(−−) = α/2,
and the expectation 〈MN〉 becomes,
〈MN〉 := P(++)− P(+−)− P(−+) + P(−−)
= (α− 1)2 − µ2mˆ.nˆ.
The Bell-CHSH quantity and K are therefore,
B = 2(α− 1)2 − µ2(mˆ0.nˆ0 + mˆ0.nˆ1 + mˆ1.nˆ0 − mˆ1.nˆ1)
:= 2(α− 1)2 + µ2BS, and (17)
K = 3α, (18)
with BS be the CHSH value for sharp measurement
taking both +ve and −ve values. And the conditions
(11)-(12) look:
(α− 1/2)2
23/12
+
µ2
23/6BS
> 1, (19)
(α− 3/2)2
7/12
+
µ2
7/6BS
> 1. (20)
With BS taking +ve and −ve values, respectively, the
equality of the conditions (19)-(20) represent ellipses
and hyperbolas. For |BS| = 2.82 ' 2
√
2 corresponding
ellipses and hyperbolas are plotted in Fig.1 and Fig.2,
respectively.
A choice of (α, µ) will violate both the conditions (19)
and (20) if it lies outside both the ellipse (hyperbolas),
i.e., in the yellow region in Fig.1 (Fig.2). However, the
allowed values of (α, µ) [compatible with condition (15)]
are in the green region, which has no overlap with the
yellow region. Of course there are (α, µ) outside one
curve but inside other. Changing the value of BS, we
find that there is no allowed (α, µ) which can fulfill both
the requirements imposed by the conditions (19) and
(20).
Therefore singlet state, even with most general two
outcome POVM, is not an useful advice over the unfair
classical equilibrium strategy in the PKLSZDK game.
Similar kind of argument is also true for any two qubit
state with both the marginal states completely mixed.
General strategy with non-maximally pure entangled
advice
For an arbitrary pure non-maximally entangled state
|ψ〉AB = a|00〉+ b|11〉 and the projective measurements
performed by Alice and Bob for arbitrary directions, say,
M0A ≡ (p1, p2, p3); M1A ≡ (q1, q2, q3), (21)
M0B ≡ (r1, r2, r3); M1B ≡ (s1, s2, s3), (22)
the input-output probability distribution is listed in
Table.III. Also one can express the measurement dir-
ections in polar coordinate, i.e.,
Mki ≡
(
sin θki cos φ
k
i , sin θ
k
i sin φ
k
i , cos θ
k
i
)
. (23)
Given such a strategy {|ψ〉AB, (M0A,M1A), (M0B,M1b)},
whereMki be the projective measurement along Mki , the
average payoffs of Alice and Bob can be calculated from
the Table.III, using the expression of Eqs.(3), (4), and (5),
and the expressions become:
FA =
1
8
[
3+
3
2
ab(r1(p1 + q1) + s1(p1 − q1)− r2(p2 + q2)
−s2(p2 − q2)) + 34 (r3 + s3)(p3 − q3)
+
1
4
(a2 − b2)(q3 + s3 + 2(p3 + r3))
]
, (24)
FB =
1
8
[
3+
3
2
ab(r1(p1 + q1) + s1(p1 − q1)− r2(p2 + q2)
−s2(p2 − q2)) + 34 (r3 + s3)(p3 − q3)
−1
4
(a2 − b2)(q3 + s3 + 2(p3 + r3))
]
. (25)
The condition for fair strategies thus reads:
(a2 − b2)(q3 + s3 + 2(p3 + r3) = 0, (26)
which can be satisfied by non-maximally pure entangled
state (i.e. a 6= b) with appropriately chosen measurement
settings (i.e. q3 + s3 + 2p3 + 2r3 = 0). However, here we
8Table III. Input-output probability distribution for projective measurements performed by Alice and Bob on the state |ψ〉AB =
a|00〉+ b|11〉.
++ +− −+ −−
M0AM
0
B
1
4{2ab(r1p1 − r2p2) +
b2(−1 + r3)(p3 − 1) +
a2(r3 + 1)(p3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−r1p1 + r2p2) −
b2(1 + r3)(p3 − 1) − a2(r3 −
1)(p3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−r1p1 + r2p2) −
a2(1 + r3)(p3 − 1) − b2(r3 −
1)(p3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(r1p1 − r2p2) +
a2(−1 + r3)(p3 − 1) +
b2(r3 + 1)(p3 + 1)}
M0AM
1
B
1
4{2ab(s1p1 − s2p2) +
b2(−1 + s3)(p3 − 1) +
a2(s3 + 1)(p3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−s1p1 + s2p2) −
b2(1 + s3)(p3 − 1) − a2(s3 −
1)(p3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−s1p1 + s2p2) −
a2(1 + s3)(p3 − 1) − b2(s3 −
1)(p3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(s1p1 − s2p2) +
a2(−1 + s3)(p3 − 1) +
b2(s3 + 1)(p3 + 1)}
M1AM
0
B
1
4{2ab(r1q1 − r2q2) +
b2(−1 + r3)(q3 − 1) +
a2(r3 + 1)(q3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−r1q1 + r2q2) −
b2(1 + r3)(q3 − 1) − a2(r3 −
1)(q3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−r1q1 + r2q2) −
a2(1 + r3)(q3 − 1) − b2(r3 −
1)(q3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(r1q1 − r2q2) +
a2(−1 + r3)(q3 − 1) +
b2(r3 + 1)(q3 + 1)}
M1AM
1
B
1
4{2ab(s1q1 − s2q2) +
b2(−1 + s3)(q3 − 1) +
a2(s3 + 1)(q3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−s1q1 + s2q2) −
b2(1 + s3)(q3 − 1) − a2(s3 −
1)(q3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(−s1q1 + s2q2) −
a2(1 + s3)(q3 − 1) − b2(s3 −
1)(q3 + 1)}
1
4{2ab(s1q1 − s2q2) +
a2(−1 + s3)(q3 − 1) +
b2(s3 + 1)(q3 + 1)}
are interested whether they can be useful for unfair
strategies. Given the above expressions for FA and FB
the aim is to search for strategies surpassing the classical
unfair equilibrium one. And it can be done efficiently
by using linear programming.
Examples given in manuscript: For an arbitrary |ψ〉AB =
a|00〉+ b|11〉, if Alice and Bob choose their measurement
directions as θ0i = − pi15 , φ0i = pi2 , θ1i = pi3 , φ1i = pi2 then
their average payoffs look:
FA =
1
8
[(
2a2 − 1
4
)
cos
( pi
15
)
+
3
4
cos2
( pi
15
)
+
3a
√
3(1− a2)
2
sin
( pi
15
)
− 3a
√
1− a2
2
sin2
( pi
15
)
+
45
16
+
9a
√
1− a2
8
+
2a2 − 1
4
]
, (27)
FB =
1
8
[(
7
4
− 2a2
)
cos
( pi
15
)
+
3
4
cos2
( pi
15
)
+
3a
√
3(1− a2)
2
sin
( pi
15
)
− 3a
√
1− a2
2
sin2
( pi
15
)
+
45
16
+
9a
√
1− a2
8
− 2a
2 − 1
4
]
. (28)
For a = 0.9, we get FA = 0.7066(> 1116 ) and FB =
0.5163(> 716 ).
Social optimality strategy: For the following measure-
ment settings of Alice and Bob:
θ0A = 0, θ
1
A
∼= −1.5708,
φ0A
∼= −2.3636, φ1A ∼= 0.777996, (29)
θ0B
∼= −0.6653, θ1B ∼= 0.6653,
φ0B
∼= −0.7780, φ1B ∼= −0.7780, (30)
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Figure 3. (Color on-line) Blue curve denotes the value of
FA [Eq.(31)] and the red line is the value 11/16. For every
a ∈ (0, 1), FA is less than 11/16.
we get,FA ∼= 0.6978, FB ∼= 0.5288, giving a social op-
timal strategy. At this point please note that, not all
measurement settings giving optimal B for a quantum
advice will not give FA > 1116 and FB >
7
16 . As
for example, for the state |ψ〉AB = a|01〉 + b|10〉 the
measurements choices M0A ≡ (0, 0, 1), M1A ≡ (1, 0, 0),
M0B ≡ (sin β, 0, cos β), and M1B ≡ (sin β′, 0, cos β′), with
cos β = − cos β′ = 1/√1+ 4a2b2, give the optimal Bell
violation 2
√
1+ 4a2b2 [29]. However for this settings we
get,
FA =
1
16
(
7+ 22a2 − 24a4
2
√
1+ 4a2 − 4a4 + 2a
2 + 5
)
, (31)
FB =
1
16
(
5+ 26a2 − 24a4
2
√
1+ 4a2 − 4a4 − 2a
2 + 7
)
. (32)
For any value of a ∈ (0, 1), FA does not satisfy the
required condition (see Fig.3).
